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Abstract— In this paper the general susceptibilities of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) against modern-cyber 
threats are explored and potential solutions proposed. This is 
achieved by applying digital-twin architectures and data-
driven methods to UAVs to facilitate identification of real-time 
intrusions and anomalies. These concepts are validated by 
performing novelty detection on open access UAV flight data 
with GPS spoofing attacks, which represents a typical system 
use-case. Multiple machine learning models are trained to 
demonstrate the feasibility of detecting modern cyber-
intrusions and anomalies using the digital-twin architecture. 
This includes both classical and deep learning techniques to 
help identify the most suitable model types for the proposed 
design. The overall results are positive and help highlight the 
potential of digital-twin architectures for the UAV contexts. 
Keywords—Digital-twin, Machine Learning, Novelty 
Detection, UAV, UAS, Intrusions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The adoption of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) has 
grown rapidly in recent years, with established use-cases 
throughout both civilian and military domains. This includes 
many high-risk and safety-critical applications like military 
operations, structural inspection, and emergency service 
response. In these contexts there are serious consequences if 
security is compromised, especially through vulnerabilities 
or malicious cyber-attacks.   
 The number of attacks on cyber physical systems has 
increased significantly based on publicly available 
information [1]. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) rely 
critically on external sensor data such as Global Positioning 
System (GPS), and this reliance presents vulnerabilities to 
attacks or exploits like spoofing and manipulation. These 
attacks are feasible at low-cost using off the shelf 
components and can be targeted against high-value assets, 
such as aircraft, maritime vessels and UAVs [2]. These 
malicious actions can lead to unintended control movements, 
collisions, crashes and hijackings. 
 The rapid emergence of UAV technology and the use of 
concepts from manned aviation means most designs did not 
originally centre around cyber-security and safety [3]. 
Subsequently, many critical sub-systems can be susceptible 
to physical and cyber-based attacks. Therefore, the ability to 
detect intrusions and mitigate their impact is important for 
flight safety and mission success. Existing studies have 
explored UAV vulnerabilities, including [3] and [4], who 
emphasise the key issues associated with navigation, 
communication and control-based attacks. Anomaly 
detection techniques are effective for countering these threats 
and many  recent advances in this field can be applied to 
aviation [5]. Supervised learning-based models show 
promise for detecting intrusions when labelled data is 
available, including GPS-spoofing [6], ADS-B attacks [7], 
Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) malfunctions [8] and 
network intrusions [9]. Sufficient quantities of labelled 
anomalies are difficult to acquire however, and so 
unsupervised learning overcomes this by modelling normal 
behaviour to identify anomalies without the requirement for 
labels. This is known as novelty detection and is well-studied 
for UAVs, with classical-based approaches like One-Class 
Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM), Isolation Forest (IF) 
[10] and Local Outlier Factor (LOF) [11] being common. 
Recently, deep unsupervised learning architectures have 
emerged, including autoencoders for automatic UAV fault 
detection [12] and Long-Term Short-Term (LSTM) networks 
for detecting ADS-B manipulation [7]. These generally show 
significant performance gains compared to classical 
techniques, at the expense of increased complexity, 
computational overhead and data quantities.  
 Digital-twin architectures enable development of high-
fidelity models for real systems using vast quantities of 
operational data and expert insights. For health monitoring 
and anomaly detection, such architectures can identify 
intrusions or anomalies that fall outside normal operation. 
Existing literature has explored this for industrial 
applications using similar techniques to those above, 
including [13], [14], and [15] who use digital-twins to detect 
anomalies in manufacturing and energy systems using 
machine learning. The concepts and benefits realised should 
equally apply to UAVs. 
 In this paper, UAS architectural enhancements are 
proposed to reduce the impacts of sensor-based security 
threats and anomalies during flight. This is achieved through 
applying digital-twin architectures and data-driven methods 
to UAV platforms. This develops the concepts from existing 
work on digital twins [13] and applies it to aviation for real-
time UAV novelty detection of intrusions using machine 
learning. The proposed design is validated by evaluating 
various novelty detection models on UAV data with GPS 
sub-system spoofing attacks. These models are 
representative of how the digital-twin would represent 
normal behaviour across each sub-systems and use this to 
detect real-time malicious intrusions or anomalies. 
Discussions follow the analysis on the most suitable model 
types to be used. In the true system, these would extend 
beyond just GPS sub-system monitoring. 
The aim of this paper is to improve the cyber-security, 
operational safety and reliability of UAVs through applying 
data-driven methods and a digital twin architecture to 
complement human-in-the-loop systems. The contributions, 
in addition to existing studies, are the following: 
1) Application of digital-twin architectures to the context 
of UAVs for real-time monitoring of intrusions and 
anomalies to enhance security. 
 
 
2) Application of real-time time-sequencing novelty 
detection machine learning models to UAV flight log time-
series data. 
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Unmanned Aerial Systems Overview  
UAS architectures vary in size, shape and type. They are 
flown either autonomously through on-board computers, or 
remotely by an operator. Both of these options are available 
in some systems, subject to requirements. In general, there 
are three main aspects to a UAS [16]: 
1) One or more UAVs containing mission-specific 
payloads. 
2) A Ground Control Station (GCS) for UAV mission 
planning, programming, guidance and control. 
3) Communications between system components. 
This paper assumes that UAVs are programmed with 
mission plans from the GCS before flight. The UAV 
autonomously executes a mission using sensors, navigation, 
and control systems. The GCS maintains continuous 
communications, so that mission and UAV flight data is 
received in real-time. This also allows the operators to 
reprogram or reconfigure the onboard systems if required. 
 
Fig. 1. High-level system interaction between GCS and remote UAVs. 
B. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Overview  
The UAV is an embedded systems platform controlled 
and monitored by the GCS. The platform contains many 
technologies and sub-systems that perform sensing, 
communication, reasoning, actuation and control. 
Autonomous designs pilot themselves using embedded Flight 
Control Systems [17] that gather information from sensors, 
with a  typical system shown in Fig 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Breakdown of major UAV sub-systems. 
The sensors perceive from the environment and feed 
updates to the flight controller. The controller computes the 
required commands for the actuators to maintain safe and 
controlled flight, as configured from the GCS. This is 
conveniently framed as an agent-architecture, as shown in 
fig. 3.  
 
Fig. 3. UAV agent architecture model. 
Especially important are the GPS and inertial navigation 
inputs such as accelerometers, altimeter, gyroscopes, speed-
sensing, and magnetometers. These feed directly into the 
flight controller, and thus if inaccurate or maliciously 
tampered the consequences could lead to collisions, crashes 
or hijackings. 
C. Ground Control Station (GCS) 
The GCS is the interface through which the operators 
interact, monitor and control the UAVs. The design varies 
between systems, with examples being a smart device 
application, a remote hand-held controller, and a large-scale 
fixed command station [18]. Real-time data and commands 
can be sent between the GCS and UAV, and therefore the 
GCS represents a virtual cockpit. GCS and UAV wireless 
communications work using agreed protocols, subject to 
system type. This protocol forms a data-link between the 
system elements, thus allowing control commands and data 
to be transferred. Most systems make use of Line of Sight 
(LOS) communications, where the UAV stays within close 
enough range for direct radio waves. More complex systems 
may use Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS), where the UAV is 
controlled and monitored through satellite or relayed 
communications [19]. 
D. Security and Cyber-Threat Vulnerabilities 
The Analysis of UAV threats by [3] highlights three main 
areas for potential attacks, with examples given in Table I: 
1) Hardware attacks, where attackers have physical 
access to the UAV before flight. 
2) Wireless attacks that exploit one or more of the 
system communications. 
3) Sensor spoofing or jamming, where false information 
is sent to one or more sub-systems, leading to unintended 
control or system malfunctioning. 
TABLE I.  ATTACK POSSIBILITY EXAMPLES. 
 Example 1 Example 2 
Hardware 
Attacks 
Fuzzing attacks on 
control command data-
flows using implanted 
device or software 
Manipulation of gain 




UAV Hijacking through 
breaking communication 
sub-system encryption. 
Denial of service of UAV 
data-links, such as wide-




malicious control of 
GPS positioning. 
Spoofing or jamming of 
ADS-B system causing 




 Unless an attacker has physically exploited the UAV, the 
largest vulnerabilities are external attacks against sensors or 
communication protocols. The most common of these are 
spoofing or denial of service [18], which can cause loss of 
control, collisions, crashes and hijackings. Since UAVs rely 
significantly on sensor data for navigation and control, there 
are inherently many attack vectors [20]. 
 For example, GPS systems operate using triangulation 
and a network of satellites that provide precise clock times 
and locations. After receiving signals from different 
satellites, a UAV GPS receiver can calculate its position in 
three-dimensional space [21]. Using off-the-shelf signal 
generators, the signals from real GPS satellites can be 
maliciously simulated and modified [2] to mislead UAVs of 
their true position, as shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Simplified diagram of a GPS spoofing scenario on a UAV. 
 Another example is Automatic Dependent Surveillance – 
Broadcast (ADS-B), which is a modern air traffic control 
system that transmits data such as location, airspeed, altitude, 
heading and aircraft identification data. This functions as a 
broadcast system to alert other aircraft and prevent collisions. 
UAVs with ADS-B monitor other aircraft, and if required, 
adjust flight to avoid potential collisions [3]. These 
transmissions may be falsified or spoofed to manipulate 
UAV flight, leading to the same issues as GPS. 
E. Digital-Twin Technology 
Digital-twin architectures are a growing trend and are 
increasingly feasible due to breakthroughs in big data, cloud 
computing and the Internet of Things [14]. They are digital 
representations of real systems, which model the behaviours 
and characteristics to improve the original entity, and have 
the potential to revolutionise most major industries [22]. The 
abundance of sensor-based data on UAVs makes them 
feasible for digital-twin modelling. In this paper, they will be 
applied for cyber-intrusion and anomaly detection. The 
results from such models could be used by the system or 
operators in real-time to perform follow-up safety measures 
or system reconfigurations to mitigate risks. 
 Conventional model-based anomaly detection is 
complex, time-consuming and often requires physical design 
aspects. It generally requires deep knowledge and system 
understanding, and therefore the production of many 
specialist models for all sub-systems can be impractical [5]. 
Data-driven techniques like machine learning provide 
suitable alternatives, as shown by [6] – [12], who perform 
UAV-based anomaly detection. These techniques will be 
used within the proposed digital-twin architecture. 
III. SYSTEM DESIGN 
A. Improved System Requirements 
 If the UAV could detect attacks this could improve 
safety, since mitigating actions could be used until the attack 
stops or the aircraft is recovered. Such actions could include 
disabling impacted systems, such as GPS, and instead relying 
on deduced reckoning from the other navigation sensors. It 
could also include alerting operators, so they can carefully 
monitor the UAV and abort flying if required. Thus, there is 
a need for effective UAV anomaly and intrusion detection, to 
facilitate operator-directed or automated mitigating actions. 
In this paper, communications and sensor-based attacks are 
focussed on. An improved design is proposed that mitigates 
the discussed safety concerns resulting from cyber-attacks on 
sensor and communications sub-systems. 
This design will model normal flight behaviour and detect 
anomalies resulting from attacks. This will be accomplished 
by applying computational models to the UAV data in real-
time and raising alerts or performing contingent actions 
when anomalies are detected. The GCS acts as the central 
hub for communication and control, and therefore any 
anomalies detected will be alerted to the operators for 
follow-up action or UAV reconfiguration. 
B. System Design Description 
 The proposed design augments the existing system with a 
digital-twin architecture. This uses a digitised model for each 
UAV in the system, which learns and models the behaviour 
under normal and expected circumstances. The digital-twin 
uses a vast expanse of historic UAV flight data to achieve 
this. Overall, the proposed system contains two main 
components: 
1) A digital-twin for each UAV that models normal 
behaviour using historic data. 
2) A deployed monitoring component for real-time 
cyber-intrusion detection that is programmed into the UAV 
before flight. 
 A UAV digital-twin has many potential uses, including 
predictive maintenance, flight simulation, failure analysis, 
security enhancements and cyber-threat detection. For this 
work, only cyber-intrusion detection is considered. If a UAV 
sub-system is subjected to an attack during flight, the 
proposed system can detect and highlight this in real-time to 
enhance safety, reliability and robustness. It does this by 
discriminating between normal and anomalous flight 
behaviour.  
 Each digital-twin will contain multiple behaviour and 
novelty detection models trained on historic flight data from 
the expected environment. A model is produced for each 
major sub-system, which represents the expected sub-system 
behaviour and characteristics under normal flight conditions. 
This allows precise pinpointing of anomalies to a sub-system 
level. In addition to flight data, the system will benefit from 
the input of experts, including design engineers, maintenance 
engineers and UAV operators are depicted in Fig 5. These 
experts deeply understand the system and can provide 





Fig. 5. Overview of the data interactions in the digital-twin architecture. 
 The UAV digital-twin is maintained on the GCS 
infrastructure. This allows the use of higher performance 
hardware and resources to exploit vast data quantities, which 
would be impractical on the UAV embedded systems. There 
may be times where the GCS and UAV have lost 
communications, or the latency is too high for real-time 
analysis, and so the UAV would require direct access to the 
models. Thus, the GCS will deploy trained model instances 
into each UAV before flight, during mission planning. This 
is the reason for the deployed monitoring component, which 
enables real-time inference of anomalies during flight. 
 
Fig. 6. UAV agent model with the deployed monitoring component. 
 The monitoring component is programmed into the flight 
controller and accesses real-time UAV flight features to 
continuously monitor for anomalies, which are fed back to 
the operators, as shown in Fig.6. This is similar to the work 
conducted by [3], who introduced the concept of an autopilot 
cyber-security supervisor. On detecting a sub-system 
anomaly the flight controller alerts the GCS. Depending on 
the operator pre-configured UAV settings, the flight 
controller could automatically reconfigure the system to 
mitigate the issue. For example, on detecting a GPS spoof 
attack, the flight controller automatically ignore GPS and 
rely on inertial navigation until the attack has stopped. This 
could be performed similarly on any other sub-system, 
provided it does not jeopardise safety as informed by experts 
in the design process. 
 These types of system configuration depend on the 
mission context and location, including safety and risk 
considerations, and therefore it would be an operators 
responsibility to configure the UAV appropriately. For 
example, if the environment was known to be routinely 
exposed to GPS spoofing attacks, it could be prudent to 
configure the flight controller to temporarily ignore suspect 
GPS-signals when an attack is detected, and instead rely on 
the inertial navigation sensors. Fig 7 shows the overall 
process for the proposed design, including the digital-twin 
and deployed component. 
 
Fig. 7. Overview of the digital-twin modelling process for anomalies. 
C. GPS sub-system example 
 To demonstrate the use of the proposed system, the 
example of GPS spoofing attacks will be used. It is assumed 
that the UAV GPS sensors extract a range of features from 
external GPS signals, such as satellite identification, 
longitude, latitude, altitude, signal strength, doppler shift and 
carrier phase characteristics. This, in addition to other sensor 
and navigation data is processed by the flight controller. 
 
Fig. 8. UAV model for the proposed system detecting GPS intrusions. 
 The monitoring component produced from the UAV 
digital-twin contains a GPS-specific model. This analyses the 
behaviour of the flight controller and its modelled states, and 
compares this against its own expected behaviour model. 
Whenever there are large discrepancies, the monitoring 
component predicts the GPS system as anomalous and 
informs the flight controller. 
 If the flight controller was pre-configured by the 
operators to automatically counter anomalies, it shall 
automatically reconfigure the navigation models to ignore 
GPS and use inertial navigation inputs for deduced reckoning 
inputs until the anomaly is lifted. At all times during this 
process, the system state, alerts and configuration is sent to 
the operators in real-time using the system communications. 
IV. METHODOLOGIES AND SYSTEM ALGORITHMS 
A. Anomaly and Novelty Detection 
 The digital-twin uses novelty detection models to 
discriminate between normal and anomalous behaviour. 
Anomalies are assumed to arise when cyber-intrusions occur, 
and the digital-twin is used to detect these. Anomaly 
detection models identify inputs that deviate significantly 
from normal data, which relies on having enough normal and 
anomalous data to learn from [23]. Using UAV data with 
 
 
normal and anomalous flights, a model can be trained to 
recognise anomalies. The problem is that anomalies are rare 
and difficult to obtain in sufficient quantities for training [5]. 
There may also be unseen attacks that the model would fail 
on without past data. 
 These issues are overcome with novelty detection, which 
trains exclusively on normal (non-anomalous) data. 
Resources are not wasted on collecting examples for all 
possible anomalies, since only normal data is needed. After 
training the model can classify new data as normal or 
anomalous, provided there is a detectable difference between 
the distribution of features. Any deviation beyond a chosen 
threshold can be classified as anomalous. A cyber-intrusion 
is likely to make the system behave abnormally [3]. Thus, 
assuming an intrusion is reflected in the data, a novelty 
detection model can detect this, even for unseen attacks. 
 Model production involves two stages: training and 
inference. Historic UAV flight data is used to train normal-
behaviour models. Once sufficiently tuned and tested, the 
model is deployed into the UAV and used for real-time 
inference on new data. The real-time data is pre-processed 
exactly the same as during training, and fed into the deployed 
model. Dependent on the variation between these new 
features and the expected features, the model will classify 
inputs, as illustrated inFig 9. 
 
Fig. 9. Novelty detection process, with training and inference elements. 
 The training of the digital-twin takes place in the GCS, 
whilst real-time inference takes place on the UAV embedded 
flight controller using deployed versions of the models. 
Rather than training one large model the digital-twin 
contains models for each sub-system, which contain only the 
most relevant and insightful features from the data. This 
reduces complexity and the number of redundant features 
each model must process. For example, the GPS sub-system 
model would keep useful features for identifying spoofing or 
jamming, such as those relating to navigation, location, and 
positioning. Selection of key features is one of the roles 
played by experts in the digital-twin architecture. 
B. Novelty Detection Algorithms 
 A wide variety of novelty detection algorithms exist, 
including distance-based, ensemble-based, statistical, 
domain-based, and reconstruction-based [5]. Due to the vast 
number available, only a subset of algorithms were 
considered during analysis and evaluation. These included 
One-Class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM), Isolation 
Forest (IF), Local Outlier Factor (LOF), and various Deep 
Neural Network (DNN) encoder-decoder architectures. Each 
model was evaluated on real UAV data for detecting GPS 
spoofing attacks, which is a typical function expected from 
the digital-twin. 
 OC-SVM is a domain-based detection technique, which 
defines a boundary to separate normal instances from 
anomalous ones based on the training data. It is an extension 
of the Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier to work 
with unlabelled data in an unsupervised learning context 
[24]. The SVM algorithm captures all data points from one 
class and separates them from another using a maximised 
margin. It does this by mapping the input data into a complex 
non-linear feature space. For linearly inseparable problems, 
this new feature space can provide projections that separate 
data instances effectively. Computation for this can be 
expensive, however kernel functions make this more 
efficient. A common choice is the Gaussian kernel, which 
provides a mapping into a higher-dimensional dot product 
space [25]: 
 
 Where xi and xj are vectors with the ith and jth feature 
values of training data, Φ is a chosen mapping function, and 
σ is a free-parameter optimised for the problem. 
 After feature space mapping, the separation of the data 
classes is achieved through maximising a hyperplane of 
separation using convex quadratic programming techniques. 
OC-SVM is similar to the standard SVM model described, 
except it only uses one class representing normal data. After 
training, the model maps input data into the feature space, 
and predicts whether it is normal or anomalous based on its 
relative position. 
 The IF algorithm uses a large number of decision trees to 
classify instances as normal or anomalous based on anomaly 
scores computed for each instance. Anomalies tend to be 
easier to isolate, and therefore tend to have shorter paths 
lengths compared to normal instances [26]. The anomaly 
score for each instance is calculated by using the path lengths 
from the root to the terminating nodes. Those with shorter 
paths are more likely to be anomalies, whilst longer ones are 
more likely normal. The benefits of this algorithm include 
high-performance on high-dimensional datasets and its fast 
computation time for large datasets [26], both of which are 
important for UAV data. 
 LOF is a clustering-based algorithm that works by 
finding the k-nearest neighbours and identifying local 
outliers at each cluster. An anomaly score is determined for 
each instance, which is the ratio between the density of the 
instance and the average density of the nearest cluster [5]. 
This works well for detecting sparse outliers when trained on 
representative dense regions of normal data. However, such 
distance-based clustering does not scale well to high-
dimensions due to the curse of dimensionality, and so feature 
reduction is often required. 
 A neural network is a machine learning model inspired 
by human biological neurons. Their form can be modified to 
create many different architectures, one of which is an 
encoder-decoder [27]. These architectures, known as 
autoencoders, employ reconstruction-based methods suitable 
for novelty detection. This works on the principle that 
anomalous data loses more information when reduced to a 
lower-dimensional space compared to normal data [5]. 
 
 
 These models have equal numbers of input and output 
neurons, and one or more hidden layers with fewer neurons. 
Since the inner layers have less neurons than the outer-
layers, the network reduces the data dimensionality as it 
passes through the network [5]. The model then reconstructs 
the original data as effectively as possible from the lower-
dimensional latent representation, as shown in Fig 10. 
 
Fig. 10. Encoder-Decoder architecture representation. 
 The first component is the encoder (Equation 3), which 
compresses the input features to a lower-dimensional latent 
vector. The decoder component (Equation 4) follows this by 





 In general, any number of hidden layers with non-
linearities can be used for the encoder and decoder to 
produce deeper networks with greater learning capacities 
[25]. The basic layers in Fig 10 are generally fully-connected 
(dense) by default, but may be modified appropriately to 
create more complex architectures including Convolutional 
Neural Network (CNN) or Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) 
autoencoders. 
 Since the latent representation is lower-dimensional than 
the original data, the model is forced to encode the data 
efficiently. The decoder reconstructs the original data from 
this lower-dimensional representation. The models are 
optimised through minimising the Mean Squared Error 
(MSE) reconstruction training loss (Equation 5). 
 
 
 This gives a vector of reconstruction losses for each 
feature averaged over the number of samples, n. The final 
training loss used for optimisation is the mean reconstruction 
error across all features, which is a scalar value. For novelty 
detection, anomalies are reconstructed poorly with large 
MSEs compared to normal data. Therefore, the 
reconstruction errors can be used to identify anomalies by 
setting a threshold above which instances are considered 
anomalous [5]. 
 The basic autoencoder architecture can be enhanced by 
introducing noise into the encoder during training. This is 
known as a denoising autoencoder and can improve 
generalisation performance, since the network learns to 
reconstruct noise-free inputs [28]. A simple way to achieve 
this is to use dropout layers throughout the network to 
randomly disable different combinations of neurons during 
training iterations [29]. 
 Three deep encoder-decoder architectures were 
considered in this work. The first was a Denoising 
Autoencoder, which takes point-based data as the input 
without consideration of time-dependency. The other 
architectures are time-sequencing models that learn and 
exploit patterns in data over time through using time-
windowed input features, which included a convolutional 
autoencoder and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) 
autoencoder. Since UAV data consists of time-series data 
that changes over time, it is expected that a model that 
understands patterns over time would be more robust, as 
shown by [7] for ADS-B messages. 
 A CNN contains spatially local connections and applies 
kernels, which are patterns of weights replicated across many 
localised regions in an image [30]. Applying kernels to a set 
of input features is known as a convolution. Although mainly 
used for 2D data like images, 1D convolutions are effective 
for modelling one-dimensional features with sequential 
dependencies like UAV time-series data. In this regard, it can 
be formed into an autoencoder architecture using the same 
principles discussed above. 
 RNN architectures are networks that use cycles in the 
computation graph to maintain an internal state or memory 
that can exploit patterns across data over time [30]. An 
LSTM network is an RNN architecture with LSTM layers, 
which can be used to produce an autoencoder network using 
the same principles as the convolutional model. 
 A final consideration for autoencoder-based novelty 
detection models is the requirement to select a threshold 
(reconstruction error value) for identifying anomalies. 
Existing works like [7] select this by conducting k-folds 
cross-validation on training data and selecting the average 
value below which 95% of data is correctly classified as 
normal. A similar approach is used in this work, except this 
time a threshold factor is chosen, which is multiplied by the 
standard deviation and added to the mean of the 
reconstruction errors (Equation 6). 
 
 
 The threshold factor provides control of how likely a data 
instance is to be classified as anomalous relative to the 
training data. This is important to set appropriately, so that 
similar flights are not inadvertently classified as anomalous. 
This was validated during analysis using an allocated sub-set 
of the test data containing anomalous instances. 
 
 
V. ANALYSIS, VALIDATION AND DISCUSSIONS 
A. Overview of Analysis 
 For analysis GPS spoofing attacks were chosen to 
demonstrate the design performing novelty detection. This 
process would be similarly conducted for all other UAV sub-
systems. The performance of six different novelty detection 
models are compared, including OC-SVM, IF, LOF, 
denoising autoencoder, and time-sequencing convolutional 
and LSTM autoencoders. The results are used to discuss the 
most suitable model for the digital-twin architecture. 
 The open-source UAV attack dataset is used [31], which 
contains a mixture of normal flights and GPS-spoofed flights 
for six UAV platforms. A similar process is followed relative 
to [11] and [12], who also perform novelty detection on this 
dataset. However, improvements are made, including more 
generalisable models across all datasets, and enhanced 
interpretability of predictions. These elements are both 
important for the digital-twin design. 
 The data is provided as down sampled UAV log data, 
representing normal behaviour and a small subset of spoofed 
instances (Table II). The authors provide no processed 
ground-truth labels for anomalies, however they provide the 
time and duration of each spoof. This was used to hand-label 
anomalies for model evaluation. 
TABLE II.  DATA PROVIDED WITHIN THE UAV ATTACK DATASET. 
 Normal Flight Data 
Instances 
GPS Spoofed Data 
Instances 
Yuneec H480 Hexacopter 2971 44 
PX4 Standard Plane 1406 46 
Holybro S500 Quadcopter 3201 46 
3DR IRIS+ Quadcopter 3858 44 
PX4 Standard Tailsitter 1163 46 
DeltaQuad VTOL 1420 50 
 Each UAV flight used a PX4 Autopilot and a Pixhawk 4 
controller. The GCS used the QGroundControl software for 
UAV planning, data processing and control. All flights are 
provided as time-series in .csv format, with a single 
timestamp per row. Each row contains 88 UAV features, 
such as airspeed, altitude, pitch, heading, GPS co-ordinates, 
and climb-rate. All UAVs had similar flights, with minor 
variations between rotary and fixed-wing designs, as shown 
in Fig 11.  
 
Fig. 11. GPS co-ordinates for normal flights from the UAV Attack Dataset. 
 The spoofed data is similar, except the GPS is spoofed at 
some random point, resulting in the UAV being fooled for 
thirty seconds. The purpose of the models is to identify when 
the UAV is being spoofed, which would happen in real-time 
for the proposed system using the deployed monitoring 
component from the digital-twin architecture. 
B. Data Preprocessing 
 The data is high-dimensional with 88 UAV features. 
Many of these are redundant or null, and therefore cleaning 
and feature reduction was required. Many features had 
widely ranging scales, and so standardisation was applied to 
give each feature zero-mean and unit standard deviation 
(Equation 7). 
 
 Where x'j is the vector of transformed values for the jth 
feature, xj is the original jth feature vector, μj is the feature 
mean sample, and σj  is the feature standard deviation. 
 Furthermore, the OC-SVM, isolation forest and LOF 
models performed poorly with high-dimensions, and 
required dimensionality reduction. Therefore, Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) was used with a suitable 
proportion of variance retained. The autoencoder 
architectures did not require this and performed well by 
default. For the OC-SVM, isolation forest, LOF and 
autoencoder models the preprocessing operations are 
summarised in Fig 12. 
 
Fig. 12. Preprocessing pipelines various model types. 
 Fig. 13 shows the convolutional and LSTM autoencoders 
model time-sequences and past values, which adds 
preprocessing complexity. The data was sorted by time for 
each flight, and processed into time-sequencing sliding 
windows. 
 
Fig. 13. Preprocessing pipeline for the Convolutional Autoencoder time-
sequencing model. 
All preprocessing techniques are summarised in Table III. 






















Standard scaling None None 
LSTM 
Autoencoder 
Standard scaling None 
Time-ordered sliding 
windows of length 6 
Convolutional 
Autoencoder 
Standard scaling None 
Time-ordered sliding 
windows of length 4 
 
 
C. Model Production 
 All analysis was performed using Python open-source 
packages, with Pandas used for data loading and 
manipulation [32], and Scikit-Learn [33] for preprocessing 
and creation of the classical models. Keras was used for all 
autoencoder models [34]. 
 Rather than optimising model hyper-parameters 
separately for each UAV, the analysis sought models that 
maximised performance across all platforms. This prioritised 
robust models that do not require bespoke tuning for each 
UAV and therefore provide better generalisation, which is 
important for the digital-twin. This was performed using 
hyper-parameter grid-searches across a wide range of 
potential combinations with k-folds cross-validation on the 
training and validation data. This gave the final model 
hyperparameters summarised in Table IV. 

























hidden layers=[50, 3, 50], 
activation=‘selu’, dropout=0.3, 
loss=‘MSE’,  optimizer=‘adam’, 






lstm_hidden_layers=[64, 32, 4, 32, 64] 







hidden layer filters=[32, 16, 32], 
hidden layer kernels=[7, 7, 7], stride=2, 




 Although each autoencoder was allocated a number of 
training epochs (Table IV), these figures represent upper-
limits since model training was automatically stopped when 
the rate of loss improvement per epoch dropped below 0.2. 
D. Metrics for Performance Evaluation 
 For anomalies, evaluating performance using accuracy is 
misleading, given the imbalanced nature of the data. Only 
1% of the dataset contains anomalies, and always predicting 
normal yields 99% accuracy. Thus, better metrics are needed 
that consider True Positives (TPs), True Negatives (TNs), 
False Positives (FPs), and False Negatives (FNs). Good 
solutions include precision, recall and F1 score [25]. 
 Precision is the proportion of instances correctly 
classified as anomalous out of all anomalous predictions 
(Equation 8). Recall is the proportion classified as anomalous 
out of the total anomalous instances, often referred to as True 
Positive Rate (TPR) or Detection Rate (DR) (Equation 9). F1 
combines recall and precision, and is a good compromise of 




 High recall is important since it ensures the system does 
not let anomalies go unnoticed. Conversely, many false-
positives could overwhelm the system and operators, and so 
precision must also be high. The balance between both is a 
compromise, and maximising one can impact the other. 
Thus, a model that maximises both could be considered best, 
as identified by the highest F1 score. Accuracy, precision, 
recall and F1 score were all calculated for model evaluation. 
 The threshold for classifying anomalies also impacts 
model performance. Therefore, the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic Area Under the Curve (ROC AUC) was also 
computed. This metric ranges from 0 to 1 and quantifies how 
performant the TPR is relative to the False Positive Rate 
(FPR) across all thresholds [25]. A score of 1 is best, 
however the results need careful consideration since the 
score does not consider specific thresholds, but only 
represents how well the model can perform if it is calibrated 
to the best threshold. In practice, a specified threshold or 
range of thresholds is needed for the model before flight, and 
therefore a model with the best ROC AUC could still 
perform poorly with an inappropriate threshold. 
E. Results and Evaluation 
 With six UAVs in the dataset, and hence six unique 
anomaly detection problems, the overall average metric 
values were used to compare the model performance and 
suitability (Table V and Fig 14). 
TABLE V.  MEAN RESULTS FOR NOVELTY DETECTION MODELS 
ACROSS ALL SIX UAV DATASETS. 
Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1 
ROC 
AUC 
LOF 0.7949 0.5612 0.7977 0.5543 0.9247 
OC-SVM 0.9360 0.6263 0.6194 0.6197 0.7037 
IF 0.9800 0.7918 0.8008 0.7896 0.9503 
Denoising 
AE 
0.9935 0.9504 0.9967 0.9638 1.0000 
LSTM AE 0.9972 0.9906 0.9788 0.9833 1.0000 
Conv AE 0.9975 0.9765 0.9950 0.9851 1.000 
 
Fig. 14. Performance results across all UAV datasets. 
 In general, the classical models (OC-SVM, IF and LOF) 
performed poorly across multiple datasets using the same 
 
 
hyper-parameter settings, as illustrated inFig 14. Each 
struggled to generalise to the high-dimensionality data, 
which made dimensionality reduction essential during pre-
processing. This reflects the lower learning-capacities of 
these models in contrast to deep autoencoders, which 
performed well using all features as inputs. Although the 
classical models were simple and computationally efficient, 
the results suggest they might not perform well enough to be 
feasible without significant improvements or changes to the 
modelling process used in this work. 
 The results show the autoencoder-based models were 
superior, with the time-sequencing convolutional and LSTM 
autoencoder variants performing marginally better across all 
metrics. This reflects the higher model expressiveness from 
autoencoders on high-dimensional time-series datasets, in 
contrast to the classical models. 
 The time-sequence autoencoder models appear to be 
marginally better than the denoising autoencoder, which 
could suggest these benefitted from additional insights from 
time-sequences, rather than independent instances. Such 
modelling allows time-dependent aspects to be represented, 
such as trajectories and co-ordinate displacements resulting 
from velocity, heading and actuator position changes, 
making anomalies easier to spot. However, it should be 
highlighted that these conclusions cannot be drawn from this 
work alone due to the constrained and limited size of the 
UAV dataset considered, in conjunction with the marginal 
performance differences observed. It should also be 
highlighted that such time-dependent models have a 
tendency to overfit smaller training datasets, and therefore 
much larger and representative flight data would be needed 
to ensure they generalise reliably. Further experimentation 
with more complex, diverse and sufficiently large UAV 
time-series datasets is required to confirm these conclusions, 
which was beyond the scope of the scope of this work. 
 Further limitations of the autoencoder-based models 
include the increased complexity and longer training time, 
especially the LSTM. Fortunately, these models would not 
be trained during flight, but instead on the GCS before 
deployment to the UAV. Inference times were insignificant 
in comparison to other models during analysis, and so this is 
unlikely to be problematic. However, this would need 
validation through physical trials on UAV embedded devices 
using much larger datasets to ensure no real-time 
computational issues arise. 
 Based on the experimentation results, the UAV digital-
twin would perform best for intrusion detection using an 
autoencoder-based model. In particular, the convolutional 
variant appears optimal from those evaluated, since it 
performed best overall and has the capacity to model time-
dependent features. Despite this, the results were very similar 
and further experiments would be recommended on larger 
and more representative UAV datasets to analyse this in 
practice. Furthermore, in terms of computational efficiency 
and speed, the convolutional variant was much faster to train 
compared to the LSTM model, which further advocates the 
convolutional model for this application. 
F. Further Autoencoder Architecture Benefits 
 In addition to enhanced performance across all metrics, 
the autoencoders bring valuable interpretability and 
explainability capabilities for anomalies and intrusions. The 
reconstruction losses can be calculated for each individual 
input feature, and these can highlight specific features that 
were difficult to reconstruct for the given inputs. During 
experimentation, the mean and standard deviation for feature 
reconstruction losses were calculated on the test data, with a 
sample of mean results, shown in Fig 15.  
 
Fig. 15. Mean test feature reconstruction errors for top 15 features using the 
denoising autoencoder. 
 A high mean feature reconstruction error suggests that 
feature varies significantly to the expected UAV behaviour. 
Similarly, a high standard deviation suggests high 
uncertainty for a given feature. These results would be useful 
as feature importance scores to indicate to UAV operators in 
real-time why particular inputs were classified as anomalous. 
 Additionally, the autoencoder latent encodings provide 
insights into how similar new data is relative to expected 
data. Low-dimensional latent representations can be 
visualised to compare anomalous and normal data samples, 
as shown in Fig 16 for predictions on the 3DR IRIS+ 
quadcopter. This can help visually indicate how significant 
an anomaly is relative to normal behaviour, which could be 
valuable for both in-flight monitoring and post-flight analysis 
of faults, intrusions or anomalous events, thus extending the 
digital-twin capabilities further. 
 
Fig. 16. Autoencoder latent encodings and predictions for test data on the 
3DR IRIS+ quadcopter. 
G. Final Discussions 
 From this analysis, the prospect of using a digital-twin 
for UAV cyber-intrusion detection is promising. As 
previously described, deployed versions of the models would 
be programmed into each UAV controller to act as a 
monitoring component, thus working in real-time across all 
sub-systems. This concept worked against GPS spoofing, 
where novelty detection models were effective against 
 
 
sensor-based intrusions and anomalies resulting in deviations 
from normal behaviour. The classical novelty detection 
models struggled with the high-dimensional UAV data in 
this case, in contrast to deep autoencoders that performed 
significantly better, with exceptional results on the chosen 
example use-case. 
 The predictions demonstrated in these experiments would 
feed directly into the flight controller. If preconfigured to do 
so, the flight controller could automatically reconfigure or 
reset the system to mitigate any safety risks. Otherwise, the 
operators would be alerted through the real-time 
communications, thus allowing them to respond 
appropriately. The level to which a human remains in the 
loop in this case would depend on the safety context and 
mission nature.  
To further validate the concepts of the proposed digital-twin 
design, these models could be evaluated on larger UAV 
datasets with a greater variety of sub-system cyber-
intrusions, such as ADS-B, data-link communications, and 
inertial navigation sensor attacks. Furthermore, there is 
potential to develop this work by moving towards deep 
generative and probabilistic modelling techniques within the 
digital-twin. Architectures like Variational Autoencoders 
(VAEs) and variants thereof are effective for unsupervised 
novelty detection [35], along with Generative Adversarial 
Networks (GANs) [36] and deep autoregressive architectures 
[37]. Such architectures could provide more useful 
representations of UAV behaviour since they model the 
underlying distributions of the data, thus enabling generation 
of simulated flight data to complement the digital-twin 
architecture and produce more robust models. The challenge 
in this context is modelling long sequences of high-
dimensional time-series data using generative models, rather 
than independently and identically distributed point data. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
  
 This paper demonstrated the impact of digital twin 
architecture through the production of novelty detection 
models from historic flight data, which were demonstrated 
against GPS spoofing intrusions with good results. The 
digital-twin is instrumental in modelling the UAV using vast 
expanses of past data and inputs, whilst the deployed 
monitoring component on the UAV is responsible for putting 
these models to practical use through real-time inference of 
cyber-intrusions and anomalies to enhance security. 
 Further modelling techniques could have been 
investigated during the analysis. In particular, deep 
unsupervised learning architectures such as VAEs and GANs 
could be adapted to provide the benefits of generative 
models, such as deeper understanding of UAV behaviour and 
simulation of vast quantities of new data. However, the main 
priority of this work was not to evaluate the best anomaly 
detection technique for aviation-related data, but rather to 
demonstrate the feasibility of a digital twin architecture that 
applies data-driven algorithms to perform real-time detection 
against intrusions and cyber-threats. Therefore, investigating 
the feasibility and potential of such state-of-the-art models 
for UAV data could prove valuable for future research. 
 Additionally, future work could develop the concepts 
from this work into a physical prototype with a collection of 
behaviour models trained from historic flight data. These 
could be turned into novelty detection models for each major 
sub-system, as was performed for the GPS sub-system in this 
paper. Finally, these models could be tested during real flight 
trials and simulated attacks against the UAV, and the results 
used to validate the true potential of the proposed system. 
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